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Business Creation and Transformation Processes in Four Software 
Companies in Dalian, China: Commonalities and Differences 
 




  This study aims to determine the nature of entrepreneur behavior, business creation, and 
transformation of software companies in Dalian City through case studies.  
  Four companies that were launched in the 2000s were studied. These companies' businesses 
initially involved labor-intensive processes of offshore software development for the Japanese 
market. However, they were confronted with the challenge of business transformation after the 
global financial crisis. Their set agenda included forays into high-grade processes, diversification of 
products and services, and exploitation of the Chinese market.  
  All four companies tried to transform themselves by creating a unique advantage. The 
development of such an advantage was a focal point for the software companies to transform their 
business structure that relied heavily on labor-intensive offshore development. The acquisition of 
high-grade human resources was an important factor for gaining this advantage.  
  In the field of offshore development for the Japanese market, cross-border cooperation across 
processes was necessary to advance into high-grade processes. The “on/off-site” hypothesis was 
valid, while having a Bridge System Engineer (BSE) in the company was not a prerequisite.  
  Differences were observed across the four case studies. In China, Japanese-affiliated companies 
approached other Japanese-affiliated companies, while Chinese companies approached other 
Chinese companies. Moreover, the disparity of resource availability for transformation was large 
between big companies and small- and medium-sized companies. As a result, a difference was 
observed in the strategy employed by the companies for transformation, especially in personnel 





(1) Issues and Perspective 
 In a previous paper, the authors presented an explanation of how the software and information 
services industry in Dalian, China was built. The industry formation was actualized through the 
execution of the local government’s industrial policies, the entrepreneurial formation of local 





into China. All factors operated in coordination with one another (Zhang & Kawabata, 2012). 
However, concerning the specific processes involved in local company formation, the authors were 
able to study only the three largest local companies. Further, regarding the entry of foreign 
companies into the market, they were able to provide just a broad outline of offshore ordering by 
Japanese companies and their entry into the Dalian market. 
 As of 2011, there were 1,200 software and information services companies in Dalian.1 Among 
them, there were only 13 companies (1.1%) with 1,000 or more employees, 68 (5.7%) with 300-999 
employees, 324 (27%) with 100-299, and 759 (66.3%) with fewer than 100. The average number of 
employees per company was 104. Considering the sales figures, while only 77 companies (6.4%) 
generated yearly sales revenue of 100 million yuan or more, 488 companies (40.7%) had sales 
income of less than 1 million yuan, with the average annual income being 5.88 million yuan. A point 
of interest is that while 78% of all software companies in the city exhibited commercial profitability, 
only 36% of those earning less than 1 million yuan were profitable, suggesting that differences in 
company size may merit focus. 
 Regarding investor types, the 307 foreign companies (excluding those from Hong Kong, Macao, 
and Taiwan) that represent 25.6% of Dalian’s software companies recorded higher rates of 
profitability and export competitiveness than other companies did. They account for 48.6% of sales, 
88.2% of exports, and 32.6% of sales profits. 
 The topic for discussion in this study, which uses a case study methodology, is how the different 
types of companies constituting the Dalian software and information services industry acted 
entrepreneurially to create new business and to cope with any problems related to business 
transformation as they grew. Through this discussion, the formation, development, and process of 
change in this industry may appear more palpable. With regard to the industry in Dalian having 
grown as a base for offshore software development services for the Japanese market, this study 
focuses on how a system to manage offshore software development might be organized when stages 
of the development process are split between Japan and China. The study also assesses how the 
business of those companies might diversify away from its dependence on offshore software 
development for the Japanese market. In so doing, we will evaluate the commonalities and 
differences in business creation and transformation processes by differentiating the companies 
according to their scale, that is, whether the company is large or small-/medium-sized, and by 
investor type, that is, whether the company is local or foreign. 
 In this study, the facts of each case are derived primarily from the records of interview surveys 
that took place in August 2010 (the E Company) and August 2011 (the XA, BD, C, and E 
Companies), and these data were supplemented with publicly available information about each 
company. The names of the companies have been, and will be kept anonymous, and the findings, 






(2) Literature review 
 This section reviews case studies from previous research, a method commonly employed by some 
industry researchers in Japan, on offshore software development in Dalian as well as across China. 
 The results of all the studies of Chinese offshore software development companies since the latter 
half of the 2000s indicate that Chinese companies are advancing beyond labor-intensive coding and 
unit testing into highly skilled areas of the development process, such as requirements definition and 
outline design (JILPT, 2006; Takahashi, 2009; Umezawa 2005, 2007, 2011; Xu, 2006). Consequently, 
almost all the research correspondingly highlights the importance of human resource management in 
securing highly skilled talent.
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 Takashi Umezawa was the first researcher to perform a series of studies and propose a perspective. 
According to Umezawa (2007), when a software company in China receives a Japanese order for 
offshore development, it requires “on/off-site development”; that is, a part of the work has to be 
performed in Japan with the Japanese customer, rather than the entire work being completed in 
China. Further to the detailed design stage, even offshore development requires that some work be 
done in Japan and information, like dealing with specification changes and answering questions, be 
exchanged with stakeholders in Japan. Moreover, if the company participates in upstream phases like 
requirements definition or preliminary design, a systems engineer from the company or its Japan 
branch may be stationed at the client’s office, or the development may take place at its Japan branch. 
Thus, a combined on/off-site approach to development becomes necessary. Furuya (2008) adopted a 
very similar perspective to the one Umezawa developed from his case study findings. He has 
identified the key challenge in offshore development management on how to minimize the cost of 
communicating design information alternating between Japan and China. The current study 
continues this line of investigation. 
 It is, however, important to note that as his research advanced, Umezawa’s opinions changed 
regarding the role of the bridge system engineer (BSE), a person who coordinates the onsite and 
offshore development. In his 2005 study, Umezawa distinctly proposed that international travel was 
essential for a BSE; however, since his 2011 research, he no longer sees international travel as 
necessary, or the role of BSE as vital. This has led to the unresolved problem of how an argument for 
the “on/off-site development” model can remain valid when the arguments for the BSE role have 
been challenged. 
 Studies of companies in Dalian can be split into two groups. One investigated whether the Dalian 
companies entered into the more technically sophisticated stage of software development operations 
(Gao, 2010; Habuchi, 2010; JILPT, 2006). The other emphasized the differences in strategies 
adopted by companies according to their scale (Organization for Small & Medium Enterprises and 





this latter research, which are important to this study, companies with 100 or fewer employees 
specialized in uncomplicated tasks like coding, as subcontractors to Japanese companies. As the 
companies expanded, they oriented themselves toward proprietary software package development, 
IT outsourcing for the Japanese-affiliated subsidiaries in China, and technically advanced stages of 
the development process. The view that strategy differs with company scale provides a basis for part 
of this study’s investigation. 
 Case studies of IT technical expert hiring practices are quite limited. Among them, Mizuki 
Kobayashi observed from a study of 3 companies in Shenyang and Dalian that, characteristically, all 
the companies “deploy more internally developed personnel in the operations of Japanese companies 
that give importance to developing staff internally and deploy more externally hired personnel in the 
operations of European, American, and Chinese companies, which assign significance to software 
development results” (Kobayashi, 2012, p. 172). However, this finding does not eliminate the 
possibility that other factors may influence personnel policy. Building on previous research, we 
decided to focus on how volatility in the Chinese labor market, company scale, and investor type 
may influence personnel policy. 
 
2. Case Studies 
 
(1) The XA Company: A large local company
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  1) Company overview 
 The XA Company is a local entity capitalized with 100 million yuan, and 100% owned by the X 
Group. As of 2012, the company has more than 2,000 employees (XA website). The X Group is a 
major private real estate company in Dalian and is the parent company of Software Park (SP), which 
makes up the center of the Dalian Hi-tech Zone. In Dalian in 2011, the XA Company was among the 
top 20 exporters of software, and among the top 10 in sales of software products, data processing 
and administration services, and software services outsourcing (Dalian Institute of Software & 
Service Outsourcing, 2012, pp. 152-157). It is a CMMI (Capability Maturity Model Integration
®
) 
Level 3 certified organization. 
 
  2) Founding and growth process  
 The XA Company was originally SP’s IT Business Department, established in 2003. SP’s IT 
Business Department developed technical experts and deployed them as programmers and engineers 
at SP tenant companies, as part of SP’s strategy to increase its market predominance. After a defined 
period, these consultant programmers and engineers were transferred to the tenant companies as 
full-time employees. The IT Business Department expanded substantially; and, because it grew to be 





entity called the SPA Company. It started retaining its employees, who began providing services on 
behalf of the new company. At the time of going independent, along with the IT Business 
Department with a few hundred employees, SPA acquired SP’s Outsourcing Solutions Center (OSC) 
and its subsidiary in Japan. The role of the OSC department was to manage requirements between 
new SP tenant companies and customers. The number of these OSC employees was small, but they 
all possessed Japanese language ability and 2-3 years of IT experience. SP remained embedded in 
the SPA Company name until 2009 after which it became completely independent, changing its 
name to the XA Company. 
 The XA Company, in order to secure technology and personnel for its growth, engaged in 
acquisitions. First, it acquired a company in Chengdu that possessed a mobile communications 
protocol that, it believed, could spread in China in the future. It also acquired two Japanese 
companies. One was acquired to assimilate its personnel who could speak both Japanese and 
Chinese. Its employees included 40 BSEs. The other was acquired for its visible light 
communications technology apart from its personnel. In addition, XA also acquired a local 
embedded software company. 
  
  3) Changes in the business structure 
 SP’s IT Business Department engaged mainly in subcontracted application development and in 
business process outsourcing (BPO), but it began to strengthen its consulting capabilities with an eye 
on participating in more advanced phases of the development process. When the company changed 
its name from SPA to XA, it added technology design and consulting to its historical business 
domain that had been limited to outsourcing services. With regard to classification of business, 
information technology outsourcing (ITO) had decreased to less than half, while BPO had increased. 
It also began marketing services to domestic Chinese, European, and American companies in 
addition to its historical targeting of the Japanese market. At the time of this study, however, Japan 
still accounted for 70% of its operations.  
 Among Company XA’s operations, the services for Japan are divided into 5 groups: onsite and 
offshore application development and maintenance (ADM), as per the services explained above; 
information management services (IMS); embedded software development (EBD); BPO operations; 
and product engineering services (PES) focused on 
computer-aided-design/computer-aided-manufacturing (CAD/CAM). These services had originally 
been conducted in parallel with each other, but because of the reduction in application development 
in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the BPO and IMS businesses have received a relatively 
higher priority since 2011. The BPO business has expanded, for example, with staffing for 
subscription processing services for Japanese mobile phones reaching a scale of about 650 jobs. At 





system operation monitoring. Taking advantage of its extensive experience in ITO, the company 
makes effective proposals in BPO. In the company’s opinion, conducting BPO operations in China 
not only reduces unit prices but also increases efficiency. 
 
  4) The management of offshore software development  
 When orders are received from Japan for offshore development, the requirements definition and 
preliminary design are usually conducted in Japan, and detailed design, coding, and unit testing take 
place in Dalian. However, Company XA participates in the requirements definition and preliminary 
design phases in Japan, and partners with the client to create the technical specification. When such 
work takes place in Japan, various models are possible, such as XA sending an SE to work at the 
client site or working on the design at XA’s Japan subsidiary, XAJ. The purpose is to reassure the 
client, as is XAJ’s hiring of Japanese technical experts; and, some clients want their contracts to be 
with the Japanese branch. XAJ is entrusted with the responsibility of consulting, sales, and 
temporary provision of onsite technicians to clients. Project leaders (PLs) and SEs sent by XA or 
XAJ to the Japanese client subsequently move to Dalian after the upstream phases. In Dalian, they 
supervise the offshore development team. Although at XA, the people performing this role are called 
BSEs, they are not merely mediators of information. 
 
  5) Strengthening research and development, and hiring and retaining personnel 
 XA has a research institute inside the company. This institute has laboratories to facilitate research 
in embedded applications, cloud computing, and mobile technology. Besides, it promotes research 
and development in partnership with Chinese research institutes and universities.  
 XA recruits and hires talent from all over China and Japan. In addition to the Chinese employee 
turnover rate being high, it has become even more difficult to retain talent because the New Labor 
Law of 2008 made it possible for individuals to quit companies freely. XA focuses on the 
development of its personnel and also employs external recruiters to identify high-level talent. 
Believing that employees are not interested only in money, but also in feeling motivated, having 
future opportunities, and finding the work worthwhile, XA also tries to improve retention through, 
for example, new employee training and project training. 
(2) The BD Company: A major Japanese electronics company’s software subsidiary
4
 
  1) Company overview 
 The BD Company, a 100% owned subsidiary of the B Company, a major Japanese electronics 
manufacturer, was established in 2004 in Dalian Software Park in the Dalian Hi-tech Zone. It has a 
capital of US$ 2.38 million and engages 320 full-time employees. In addition, there are about 100 
people on assignment from B’s business partner companies. In Dalian in 2011, BD ranked among the 





sales of software service outsourcing (Dalian Institute of Software & Service Outsourcing, 2012, pp. 
152, 153, 157). The three reasons the company preferred to operate in Dalian were its geographical 
proximity to Japan, the availability of high-quality Japanese-speaking personnel for hire, and its 
system of preferential tax treatment. 
 
  2) Business structure 
 The company’s primary business is the development of embedded software for B’s products: B 
brand digital TVs, audio equipment, DVD players, telephones, etc. In addition, it develops software 
for loading into semiconductors, for lighting systems at Olympic venues, for municipal energy 
management solutions, and for B’s internal administrative applications. More than 90% of its work is 
outsourced from the B Company in Japan, and the remaining 10% is from B’s business units in 
China. While BD generally does its own development, it also outsources some development to local 
companies. 
 
  3) The management of offshore software development 
 While creating a requirements definition is essentially the client’s responsibility, staff are 
occasionally deputed to the client site, and sometimes the client travels to Dalian to conclude the 
activity. System design, programming, and testing take place at BD’s office in Dalian. 
Communication during those stages of the process takes place mainly via video conference and 
email, with occasional trips to each other’s offices. At BD, project leaders are referred to as BSEs. 
They are not only capable of communicating in both Chinese and Japanese, but they lead daily 
progress reviews and software development as engineers capable of advanced design. When the 
company was first founded, BD was only able to contribute in simple tasks like unit testing. 
However, now experienced engineers are enabling its engagement in design work. 
 Generally, BD always conforms to its committed deadlines; and, since 2010, its software 
development productivity (software development efficiency per engineer person-month) has been 
above the average for the Japanese domestic software companies that are vendors to B, and it is 
aiming to surpass that average by 20% in 2011. Furthermore, the development cost efficiency 
relative to Japan, that is, the relative rate of the cost of developing the same software completely in 
Japan to BD’s cost of development, has currently reached 180%, and BD is working toward raising it 
to 200% at the earliest. In other words, even with the overhead costs associated with offshore 
development, BD is still trying to be able to develop software at half the cost of developing it in 
Japan. To offset rising labor costs in Dalian, the company will increase development productivity 
and outsource work to other places in China with cheaper labor costs. 
 





 The company’s medium term plan includes three objectives: to expand its businesses in China, 
strengthen its software development process, and to put into practice a quality management system 
(QMS). 
 First, BD has a plan to raise the percentage of sales for China-related business. It is currently 50%, 
but it is targeting 65% in 2013, and 75% in 2015. It is aiming to expand in growing business fields 
by collaborating with the Dalian municipal government. In addition, the growing Chinese market is 
an attractive target for new products for which BD is aiming to develop software, primarily in the 
areas of energy management solutions, digital broadcasting and communication services, automotive 
systems, healthcare, as well as related internal administration systems for the B Company. The B 
Company also sells semiconductors with embedded software developed by BD even to the Chinese 
home appliance manufacturers to increase the sales. 
 Next, there are several reasons that require the development process to be strengthened. Unless the 
product meets the Chinese specified standards and regulations, it cannot be sold in China. To avoid 
this problem, the headquarters of the B Company in Japan needs to cooperate not only with BD, but 
also with other subsidiaries in China. Furthermore, given the difficulty in understanding Chinese 
customer preferences in detail, completion of requirements definition phase in Japan is becoming 
irrational. It illustrates the need of collaboration between B and BD. 
  Finally, improvement of quality management is necessary to expand BD’s business in the Chinese 
market. BD is attempting to obtain a CMMI Level-4 certification for the entire company. Moreover, 
it is putting PDCA (the plan-do-check-act cycle for continuous improvement) into practice, based on 
key performance indicators. 
 
  5) Recruitment and development of human resources  
 BD offers an annual technical training class for around 30 students each at three Chinese 
universities: Northeastern University, Jilin University, and the Dalian University of Technology. New 
graduates from those universities occupy 70% of BD’s new fresh recruit. The two-month duration 
classes are scheduled from May to July on workday evenings or Saturdays, and they facilitate 
discussion on a problem posed by the Japanese company for which the technical training is 
organized. In 2011, the challenge was to develop a music player for Android, and the solutions of all 
the teams were of such high quality that it was difficult for BD’s general director to believe they 
were created by third-year college students in just 2 months. BD advocates that its development 
productivity surpasses that of Japan because of the excellent quality of the university students it 
hires. 
 In the 7 years since its inception, the development of technical experts at BD has primarily been 
led by people assigned from Japan providing on-the-job training (OJT). Additionally, as an incentive, 





is a matter of pride. The results of this approach are discernible in the growth of the first- and 
second-year student hires. In addition, BD hires experienced persons, both in Japan and locally in 
China. 
  BD recommends the employees to pass level 1 of the Japanese-Language Proficiency Test after 
four years of graduate hiring, because they have to communicate with clients in Japan directly using 
the Japanese language. This employee group shows relatively high attrition rate because of the 
his/her inability to attain such level of proficiency. Additionally, there are personal reasons such as 
looking for a marriage partner in their hometown. However, as long as resignations are limited to a 
few employees leaving after working for three or four years, BD does not get perturbed because their 
work can be subcontracted. The employees with more than four years’ experience do not resign as 
they adapt to the B Group’s corporate philosophy. It means they are not attracted to other companies 
with slightly higher salaries. 
 
(3) The C Company: A local small-sized company
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  1) Company overview 
 The C Company is a local company founded in 2004 with 100 million yen in capital and has 180 
employees. A Japanese IT vendor invested 2.5% of the capital, and employees hold 10% stake in the 
company. The headquarters are located in Dalian Software Park in the Dalian Hi-tech Zone, and 
there is a branch office, the CJ Company, in Yokohama, Japan. 
 The founder, Mr. H, is a graduate from the Dalian University of Technology. He spent 2 years in 
Japan as an IT trainee and after returning to China, worked in the IT industry. Later, he co-founded 
this company with five others. All six founders were computer experts with training experience in 
Japan. The company started out with a little over 10 employees. 
 
  2) Business structure 
 The C Company is mainly engaged in offshore IT services for Japan and provides IT services to 
Chinese companies. Japan accounts for 80% of sales. The IT services for Japan, in addition to 
offshore software development, include the provision of services such as Chinese localization of 
Japanese software products and Chinese marketing support. Regarding IT services for China, the 
company provides comprehensive service packages from consulting to system design, coding, and 
system implementation management. In addition, they develop software products and provide BPO 
services, albeit only five employees are devoted to BPO. 
 The development projects vary in scale from 2 to 200 person-months. C has a CMMI Level-3 
certification and an independently developed form of PDCA quality management methodology. 
Specifically, the PDCA cycle has been thoroughly implemented through analyzing quality trends and 





function of projects. 
 
  3) The management of offshore software development 
 Most project orders are received through 5-6 primary vendors with whom C has well-established 
relationships. Japanese customers like to contract with the Japanese branch so that any potential 
problems could be resolved locally. 
 C employs three patterns for its offshore software development business. Pattern 1 consists of 
only coding, unit testing, and troubleshooting; hence, for the Japanese customer, the cost savings are 
small, but implementation is easy and low-risk. In Pattern 2, the preliminary design, detailed design, 
coding, unit testing, integration testing, and troubleshooting take place in China. For the Japanese 
customer, the cost savings are good, but because this pattern requires extensive knowledge of the 
business and design ability, it involves a high degree of difficulty for the Chinese side. In this pattern, 
coordination between C Company and the customer is extremely important. Pattern 3 represents a 
kind of contract for a dedicated offshore development team, in which, upon receiving a request from 
the Japanese customer, a dedicated Chinese team manages the research, design, coding, and testing. 
Trust between the companies is a premise for this pattern, which can also be said to be an extension 
of Pattern 2. Quality and productivity are high, and cost effectiveness is extremely good, but the 
Chinese team must be knowledgeable about the business and possess excellent design capability. C 
considers that communication problems, and not just the technological or business challenges, are 
often the cause for offshore development failures. To manage this risk, they regard communication 
between the Japanese and Chinese project managers (PMs) to be very important. 
 In addition to Patterns 1 and 2, there are many intermediate variations of C’s offshore 
development for Japan. C attempts to expand its participation into the more advanced stages of the 
development process. However, as the company receives its orders through primary vendors, there 
are few opportunities for it to contribute in requirements definition. 
 C copes with fluctuations in work volumes by sharing staff with its three partner companies, 
which implies that, in total, it has access to 300 technical personnel. 
 CJ, the country branch and the base of operations in Japan, collects information, conducts sales 
activities, prepares contracts, and provides IT services to Japanese customers. All of CJ’s 30 
employees are called BSEs, mostly assigned from Dalian, with five people having being hired in 
Japan. When a project includes preliminary design, it is primarily managed by CJ’s BSEs at the 
customers’ offices, but an additional scenario is that some employees from the main office may be 
deputed to Japan on a short-term assignment. Subsequently, the software is developed offshore in 
Dalian after which a BSE from CJ supervises the acceptability checks, release, troubleshooting, if 
any, and on-going maintenance, etc. As a result, the company specifies the desired personality and 





ability and business knowledge are considered necessary. Understandably, in many cases, a BSE 
deputed to Japan may know nothing about the customer’s business, and needs to gain that 
perspective onsite. 
 
  4) In-house product development 
 C is investing in efforts toward in-house development and offers products such as corporate 
information management systems, sales management systems, and sales support tools. The 
information management systems are products based on management systems for use within a 
company. Japanese companies are the target customers. Sales management systems target Chinese 
companies with the selling points of price and usability. C’s sales support tools are designed for the 
iPhone, and they enable the consolidated management of client data, the support of daily sales 
activities, and the sharing of personal contacts. A characteristic of these tools is that all information 
is maintained on a server, and none is stored on the phone itself. 
 
  5) Business changes and diversification 
 C envisages growth in the IT services in China. It forecasts the future business framework to be 
equally constituted of Japanese and Chinese, and plans for both the Japanese and Chinese businesses 
to expand rather than for the Japanese business to shrink.  
 
  6) Recruitment and development of human resources 
 C hires many more graduates from university than experienced professionals because graduates 
are easier to train. However, as people with special knowledge or technical skills are also needed, the 
hiring of such persons is increasing. In order to retain employees, C creates a supportive corporate 
climate. Individual development plans are made with each employee. Japanese language instruction 
used to be provided internally, but for the last 2 years, instructors from the Dalian University of 
Foreign Languages have been invited. The instructors teach lower competency level employees 3 
times a week and intermediate and advanced level employees twice a week. Employees currently 
hold 10% of the company’s stock, but C is trying to increase that to 30%. Its retention policy has 
enabled C to restrict employee turnover at 7-8%.  
 
(4) The E Company: A small-sized Japanese-owned company
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  1) Company overview 
 The E Company was founded in October 2003 in Dalian Overseas Student Pioneer Park with a 
capital of US$ 226,000, and it has 45 employees (as of August 2011). It is a Japanese company 
having a Chinese board chairperson, Mr. K, and a Japanese general manager, Mr. L. In order to save 






  2) The company’s inception 
 Mr. K, the board chairperson, lived in Japan for over 20 years because his father was employed 
there. Mr. K originally worked at a trading company specializing in foodstuffs, and as he was 
responsible for purchasing imports for Japan, he gained experience in various operational functions 
such as production management and customs clearance. He founded the E Company on his father’s 
recommendation. Since his university major was in the liberal arts, he had no skills related to 
software and learned the business on the job. When he founded the company, the demand in this 
industry was strong, but because Mr. K had no personal networks in the software field, he was faced 
with challenges in securing business. The general manager, Mr. L, was originally employed at a 
major Japanese manufacturer of electronics, where he was responsible for mechanical design. In 
1994, he was assigned to the development department at the Dalian branch, where he was in charge 
of the motor business. In 2002, he took up permanent residence in Dalian. His venture into the IT 
world was facilitated by a friend he had met while working in Japan. Hailing from the Dalian 
University of Technology, that friend founded a company in Dalian in 2002, and Mr. L went to work 
there. Subsequently, in 2003, he co-founded a different company with his friend to conduct offshore 
software development for Japanese companies. However, he quit in 2007 and joined E. 
 
  3) The management of offshore software development 
 Until 2008, E’s main line of business was typical offshore software development, for which 
secondary IT vendors in Japan provided it the orders for part of the software development process. 
 In the main pattern of E’s offshore development, the technically advanced stages of requirements 
definition and preliminary design, as well as system development and maintenance, are effected by 
senior vendors in Japan, while coding and unit testing are conducted by E in China. When orders are 
received from Japan for offshore development, a non-disclosure agreement is first signed with the 
customer. Because Japanese customers often change the technical specifications midway through the 
project, the E Company tries to set higher quoted price to cover that cost; subsequently, E negotiates 
with the customer as to who should bear the cost of specification changes to prevent losses. 
 It used to be that the Japanese-speaking BSEs at the E Company, who were responsible for 
overseas sales, played the role of mediator between the customer and E. However, now that E’s PMs 
and PLs are able to speak Japanese, BSEs are no longer required, and the usage of that term has been 
discontinued. E emphasizes that the SEs have to rely on them even though BSEs do not understand 
the technology. the role of BSE carries no responsibility What makes it worse, the role of BSE 
carries no responsibility. Consequently, it is unclear who will take the ownership for mistakes. 
 





 The E Company believed that it was difficult to be profitable by only doing offshore development 
for its Japanese client, and its personnel were not gaining in expertise. Hence, when orders dropped 
suddenly during the 2008 financial crisis and the company started to lose money, it changed 
direction and started to pour efforts into selling software packages developed in-house. Further, it 
entered and then exited the BPO business, because being a secondary or tertiary subcontractor was 
not very profitable. 
 E started focusing on in-house development, capitalizing on the Japanese language skills acquired 
during offshore development for Japanese companies and on the expertise Mr. L had in 
manufacturing and production management. First, it sold production management packages and then 
diversified into products for personnel evaluation and for managing purchases of equipment and 
tools. E accorded special attention to sales because, in contrast to software development 
subcontracting, in the packaged software business, once the development is completed, revenues and 
profits grow with increase in numbers of customers. Their target customer base is mainly small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the Dalian Development Area (DDA) and in regions that are 
trying to attract Japanese companies, like Qingdao and Tianjin. Sales approaches include accessing 
directories from the chambers of commerce and industry to make cold calls to potential clients, and 
to request acquaintances from other companies for introductions. In 2010, the cost of labor at all 
companies soared because of strikes targeting the Japanese companies in DDA, which affected E’s 
revenues as well. Meanwhile, sales to local Chinese companies are difficult for the 
Japanese-affiliated SMEs like E because of factors including collection of account receivables and 
conflict management. 
 
  5) Recruitment and development of human resources 
 Because E cannot compete with large companies in the scale of funding, organization, or sales 
networks, it is trying to overcome these challenges by providing employees with business education, 
using component-based development, and hiring excellent sales people. In particular, E is paying 
attention to hiring and developing personnel. Among its 45 employees, 40 are responsible for 
development and 5 for business operations support. This workforce strength is the result of distilling 
down what was once a staff of 100 to the more capable employees. The average employee age is 
29.8 years with 6.1 being the average years of experience. 
 The E Company hires only experienced professionals. This is because new graduates hire need to 
be trained for a year before being able to assemble a program for a customer, and it is a major 
setback to the company when they resign after training. In order to cope with the volatility in the 
labor market and employee turnover, E focuses on the employees’ futures for retention of personnel. 
In addition to offering various compensation incentives, such as salary increases and bonuses, E 





study technology and management and emphasizes that “They could all be future company 
presidents.” After joining the company, they are trained in business etiquettes followed by a new 
employee orientation and education in sales, support functions, leadership, project management, etc. 
Employees whose roles are restricted to only coding and unit testing for offshore development will 
learn nothing about the end user and never be able to write a technical specification. For that reason, 
the business transformation to development of software packages was an opportunity for employee 
growth while also being a challenge. By the time they started developing software packages, Mr. L 
provided basic instruction to the PLs for 2 hours every day for 3 months; and, all the PLs, in turn, 






(1) Commonalities and differences 
 We have observed from the case studies of these four Dalian software companies that as they 
transformed their businesses, there were some commonalities as well as some differences related to 
company scale and investor type. We believe this study makes the following contributions to the 
research literature.  
 All four companies presented in this study initially engaged in offshore software development for 
the Japanese market, providing labor-intensive components of the process like coding and unit 
testing. Until 2011, when the interviews were conducted, they were dealing with structural changes 
to their businesses as they pursued growth by advancing into more technically sophisticated levels, 
expanding their services and product offerings, and diversifying their target markets, in particular, by 
cultivating the Chinese domestic market. Moreover, at XA and E, the need to raise the level of 
companies’ technical skills as a catalyst for change was reinforced by the external stimulus of the 
financial crisis.  
 All the four companies were attempting to achieve transformation by leveraging their unique 
strengths. XA and BD were trying to achieve levels of productivity in their Dalian operations that 
could surpass that of Japan; C was laying emphasis on communication and quality; and E was trying 
to integrate lower production costs with its business management expertise. For Dalian software 
companies, the achieving of predominance over other companies is an issue of transforming a 
company’s business model away from offshore development dependent on low labor costs. 
Moreover, the strategy for recruitment and development of human resources to cope with the 
volatility in the labor market is the key to maintaining and expanding this market dominance. 
 When upgrading the offshore software development business for Japanese market, a company’s 
base in Japan plays an important role: BD, fortunately, had its parent company and customer, the B 





transnational division of labor, both within the company and in the stages of the development 
process with the customer, is inevitable given that some parts of the business, such as sales, contracts, 
requirements definitions, and preliminary designs are performed in Japan, where the customers are 
located. Coordination between a company in Dalian and its base in Japan is, therefore, important. 
These findings support Umezawa’s (2007, 2011) “on/off-site development” perspective. 
 Regarding who should be responsible for this coordination, the results suggest that the PM or PL 
of the development team and each level of engineer should assume direct ownership for 
communication in Japanese. In practice, these people are sometimes called BSEs. However, at other 
times, this reference is avoided. In the one case where a specialist position called the BSE was 
established to mediate in communication, it was viewed as an immature and problematic approach. 
In other words, while transnational coordination across stages of the development process is 
essential, the position or title of BSE is not. Sorting out this issue may make the “on/off-site 
development” perspective more consistently applicable. 
 The study also observed the different approaches of the four companies. First, Japanese-owned 
companies and local companies differed in their methods of expanding their businesses into the 
Chinese market. While BD and E assumed that the Japanese-affiliated companies in China would be 
their customers, XA and C assumed that their customers would be the local Chinese companies. It 
appears that Japanese-owned companies may perceive the existence of certain barriers in directly 
approaching local Chinese companies. 
 Another difference was the large gap in the scale of people and resources that could be mobilized 
for business transformation. XA grew multi-dimensionally through the effective means of acquiring 
companies for their technologies and personnel, while BD was able to capitalize on B Group’s 
overall resources for the development it had perceived for the Chinese market. Only a large company 
and its overseas subsidiaries could do these things. Meanwhile, business diversification for the C and 
E Companies was concentrated on the in-house development of software packages. This was a 
feasible strategy for these SMEs because while business knowledge is important for software 
package development, a huge investment of resources is not necessarily needed to raise the 
company’s skill level. However, access to end users becomes important for the sales activities for 
these packaged offerings as opposed to subcontracting for parts of offshore software development 
projects. As C and E were secondary or tertiary vendors in offshore software development for 
Japanese companies, they did not have access to the end users and did not gain any sales experience. 
It was important to overcome this challenge, especially for E that had ventured into packaged 
software as its new main business. Hence, improving the skills of its sales staff became a focus. The 
analysis of these cases shows that companies adopt different strategies according to their sizes, 
which confirms the findings of the Organization for Small & Medium Enterprises and Regional 





 In the recruitment and development of human resources, all four companies shared the 
understanding that in this highly volatile labor market, improving skills leads to changing jobs. 
However, based on their respective sizes, there was a large gap in how the companies responded to 
this challenge. BD was resilient to resignations and hired highly skilled new graduates, even getting 
involved in the administration of university classes. In contrast, E could not afford to spend a year on 
training any new graduates considering the risk of turnover. The SMEs, C and E, tried to compensate 
for their disadvantageous salary levels by focusing on human resource development as a strategic 
issue. Company scale has emerged as a factor explaining the differences in the human resource 
policies as response to the shared environmental threat of the volatile labor market. This provides an 
understanding of a different aspect of IT expert hiring practices to add to Kobayashi’s (2012) 
comparison of resource hiring and deployment practices at three large companies.  
 
(2) Future research topics: The international division of labor and business upgrades 
 This study has generated two issues for future research. The first concerns understanding how the 
business transformation at individual companies influences the international division of labor in the 
software and information services industry. We need to acquire a better understanding of the 
characteristics of Dalian’s international position. Moreover, it is necessary to investigate how the 
position may change in relation to other offshore development bases such as India and large markets 
such as Japan and America. The second issue arising from this study is the need to improve our 
understanding of the industry level mechanisms that provide opportunities for individual companies 
to upgrade their businesses, and to develop the relevant skills. Specifically, in Dalian, software and 
information services companies are clustered together, and the importance of the cluster is growing 
in the international division of labor in the software development process. How do both the local 
system and international system of collaboration and division of labor act as catalysts to promote or 
constrain a business upgrade or determine its direction? These are the subjects of our next study.  
 
※ This study was funded by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Grants-in-Aid (Basic 
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1
 The statistics in this paragraph are from the Dalian Institute of Software & Service Outsourcing 
(2012). 
2
 In addition to the references cited, the record of a large-scale field study by Chuo University’s 
Software Offshoring Joint Research Team have been published in the journal Chuugoku Keizai 





                                                                                                                                                     
research team did not provide its views or evaluation of the data. 
3
 This section, unless otherwise mentioned, is based on data from an interview with Mr. F, Director 
of Japan Sales and Marketing for the XA Company, on August 23, 2011. 
4
 This section, unless otherwise mentioned, is based on data from an interview with Mr. G, General 
Manager of the BD Company on August 24, 2011. 
5
 This section, unless otherwise mentioned, is based on data from interviews with Mr. I, Director of 
Human Resources at the C Company and with Mr. J, Senior Manager of Systems Development for 
the Japan Branch of the C Company on August 24, 2011. 
6
 This section, unless otherwise mentioned, is based on data from interviews with Mr. K, Chairman 
of the Board of the E Company on August 26, 2010 and with Mr. L, General Manager of the E 
Company on August 23, 2011. 
7
 Further, at the time of this survey in August 2011, Mr.L emphasized E’s funding constraints, but in 
the fall of 2011, the company had a funding crisis, which led to the company’s liquidation at the end 
of the year. However, Mr. L, aiming to continue the development of software packages founded a 
new company and is trying to revive the business alongwith the former employees of E. 
